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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, following the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States, was initiated in order to neutralize the 
leadership of a global insurgency1 ideologically led by al Qaeda.  Recently, 
                                                          
  Senior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 60;  
J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law, May 2011.  This Note is a 
reduced version of a Comment originally selected for publication in this edition.  The 
Comment was mooted by Al Maqalah v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the case at 
issue in this Note, because it reached the same conclusions about the habeas claims of 
Bagram detainees as stated in the original Comment.   
  I wish to dedicate this piece to those who have provided the most support to me 
during the writing process, namely Zuza, Peaches, Tigger, Pillow, Saliha, and Jerry 
Seinfeld.  Many thanks to Professor Daniel Marcus and Professor Stephen Vladeck for their 
guidance, and to the law review staff for editing the piece. 
 1. See MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS:  WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON 
TERROR 60, 217 (2004) (explaining that insurgency better defines the war against al Qaeda 
and its affiliates because a majority of these persons have military training, whereas a 
minority have training in terrorist tactics).  The term ―insurgency‖ or ―insurgents‖ will thus 
be used throughout this Case Note instead of ―terrorism‖ or ―terrorists‖ because this term 
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a number of violent encounters have occurred along the ungoverned border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a result of the escalating conflict 
between U.S. soldiers, Taliban, and al Qaeda forces.  Such military 
engagement inevitably results in a number of complex challenges for the 
U.S.; one of these challenges is the handling of captured enemies, and the 
appropriate role of U.S. courts in resolving these issues.  While the 
Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush2 afforded constitutional habeas 
corpus rights to detainees, questions remained as to the applicability of this 
case to other U.S.-run detention centers, such as the one in Bagram, 
Afghanistan.  A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, Al Maqaleh v. Gates,3 concluded that Bagram 
detainees were not entitled to habeas corpus protection, but left two major 
questions unanswered:  (1) what effect does the global nature of the 
insurgency have on habeas jurisprudence,4 and (2) what is the appropriate 
process due to combatants in wartime?5 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Following the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, the 
Bush administration began detaining noncitizen combatants at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba, leading to several court challenges by detainees and 
culminating in the Supreme Court granting constitutional habeas corpus 
protection to these detainees in Boumediene.  In deciding that the 
Guantánamo detainees were entitled to constitutional habeas corpus rights 
even though they were captured overseas,
6
 the Court looked to Johnson v. 
Eisentrager7 for guidance, deriving the following factors from that 
opinion:8  ―(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy 
                                                          
better defines the nature and severity of the threat. 
 2. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 3. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 4. See id. at 98 (limiting the discussion to the fact that Bagram was clearly in an active 
theater of war).   
 5. The circuit court explained that the detainees received inadequate process under the 
Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board, but did not extend the discussion to what would 
constitute adequate process.  See id. at 96. 
 6. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (―In deciding the constitutional questions now 
presented we must determine whether petitioners are barred from seeking the writ or 
invoking the protections of the Suspension Clause either because of their status, i.e., 
petitioners‘ designation by the Executive Branch as enemy combatants, or their physical 
location, i.e., their presence at Guantánamo Bay.‖). 
 7. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).   
 8. See id. at 778–79 (holding that German combatants captured in China during World 
War II were not entitled to habeas corpus protection, noting that ―the scenes of [the 
detainees‘] offense, their capture, [and] their trial and [. . .] punishment‖ were all outside of 
sovereign U.S. territory and jurisdiction and that the impracticality of affording ―alien 
enemies‖ Suspension Clause protection during hostilities ―would hamper the war effort and 
bring aid and comfort to the enemy‖). 
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of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the 
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and  
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner‘s entitlement to 
the writ.‖9  In applying these factors, the Court in Boumediene concluded 
that the process afforded Guantánamo detainees was insufficient,10 that the 
United States intended to govern Guantánamo Bay indefinitely,11 and that 
no practical obstacles stood in the way of granting detainees habeas 
protection.12  The Court did note that its analysis might be different if the 
detention facility were located within an ―active theater of war.‖13  One 
question remaining after Boumediene was how this reasoning would apply 
to enemy combatants detained outside the United States, but not at 
Guantánamo Bay. 
Prior to the Boumediene decision, the United States began using Bagram 
Air Base as a detention center for newly-captured detainees, even 
transferring insurgents captured outside of Afghanistan to Bagram, where 
there are now over 750 prisoners, of whom thirty are non-Afghans.14  In Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, four Bagram detainees sought habeas corpus protection 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a challenge both the 
Bush administration and the Obama administration opposed.15  The district 
court granted habeas corpus rights to some of the detainees at Bagram 
under Boumediene‘s functional test.16  The district court claimed that the 
site of apprehension factor weighed in favor of granting habeas protection 
to the detainees because they had been captured outside of Afghanistan and 
                                                          
 9. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
 10. See id. at 767 (deciding that the first factor weighed in favor of granting the 
detainees Suspension Clause protection because the government provided insufficient 
process).  The Court also explained that the Eisentrager prisoners received far more process 
than the Guantánamo detainees, as they were tried by a military commission for violations 
of the laws of war.  Id. 
 11. See id. at 768 (contrasting Guantánamo Bay with Landsberg Prison, a post-World 
War II prison that the United States did not intend to govern indefinitely). 
 12. See id. at 769 (concluding that the ―[g]overnment present[ed] no credible arguments 
that the military mission at Guantánamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had 
jurisdiction to hear the detainees‘ claims,‖ which, when viewed ―in light of the plenary 
control the United States asserts over the base, none [were] apparent to [the Court either]‖). 
 13. See id. at 770 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in result)) (recognizing that the argument that issuing a writ would be ―‗impracticable‘ or 
‗anomalous‘‖ would carry more weight were the detention facility in an ―active theater of 
war‖).  
 14. Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
16, 2009, at A8; Alissa J. Rubin & Sangar Rahimi, In Shift, U.S. Military Names 645 
Detainees Held at Key Afghanistan Base, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at A6. 
 15. Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds a Policy on Detainees 
in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A6. 
 16. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231–32 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 
F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (granting the non-Afghan detainees habeas corpus protection but 
not the Afghan detainee because of potential tension with the Afghanistan government). 
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transferred to Bagram thereby avoiding constitutional issues.17  The court 
noted that this apparent ―limitless Executive power‖ to avoid judicial 
review of Executive detention decisions raised separation of powers 
concerns, reasoning that 
[i]t is one thing to detain those captured on the surrounding battlefield at 
a place like Bagram, which . . . is in a theater of war.  It is quite another 
thing to apprehend people in foreign countries—far from any Afghan 
battlefield—and then bring them to a theater of war, where the 
Constitution arguably may not reach.
18
 
The district court also examined the site of detention factor,19 concluding 
that Bagram is substantially similar, although not identical, to Guantánamo 
and that the United States exercises practical control over the detention 
center.20  The court also concluded that the adequacy of process provided to 
Bagram detainees weighed heavily in favor of extending the protections of 
the Suspension Clause, even more than it did in Boumediene.21  Regarding 
practical obstacles in granting the writ to Bagram detainees, the court 
determined that producing detainees for habeas hearings would not be 
difficult, as modern day technology such as video conferencing could be 
used,22 and any burden created by such a process would be on lawyers and 
administrative personnel, not U.S. soldiers on the battlefield.23   
In considering this ruling on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia had to determine whether the district court 
appropriately applied Boumediene‘s three-factor test.  Concluding that the 
district court did not, the D.C. Circuit relied on factors two and three of the 
Boumediene analysis.24  Regarding the second, the court contrasted 
Guantánamo Bay with Bagram, noting that the United States has exercised 
                                                          
 17. See id. at 220 (emphasizing that the Guantánamo detainees had all been captured 
elsewhere and brought to Guantánamo Bay ―with which they had no previous connection,‖ 
just like the four detainees before the court who were transferred to Bagram from other 
countries). 
 18. Id. (internal quotation and brackets omitted) (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765). 
 19. Id. at 215. 
 20. See id. at 221–26 (finding that the site of detention factor, while not supporting the 
Bagram detainees to the ―same extent‖ as it did the Guantánamo detainees, nevertheless still 
shows that ―the United States has a high objective degree of control at Bagram‖).   
 21. See id. at 227 (citing the fact that the government conceded that the process for 
Bagram detainees was ―less comprehensive‖ than the CSRT process). 
 22. See id. at 228 (commenting that modern methods of communication are routinely 
used in Guantánamo habeas proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which means that the government does not have to physically transfer the 
detainees to the United States). 
 23. See id. at 228–29 (dismissing the government‘s concern that it would have to ―pull[] 
potential witnesses from the battlefield‖ to testify in habeas proceedings because ―all four 
petitioners in these cases claim to have been captured outside Afghanistan, far removed 
from any battlefield‖). 
 24. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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de facto sovereignty over Guantánamo Bay for over 100 years, whereas in 
Bagram the United States has shown ―no indication of any intent to occupy 
the base with permanence.‖25  As to the third factor, the court immediately 
noted that Afghanistan ―remains a theater of war,‖26 stating that it was 
undisputed that Bagram Air Base is ―exposed to the vagaries of war,‖ thus 
rendering it impractical to grant detainees habeas protection.27  Even 
though the D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that the process 
afforded the Bagram detainees was less than that afforded to the 
Guantánamo detainees, this factor did not outweigh the second and third 
factors,28 which weighed strongly in favor of declining to extend habeas 
protection to the Bagram detainees.29  
II. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
A. A War Without Borders 
Based on the three factor test enunciated by Boumediene, the  
D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh properly concluded that constitutional habeas 
corpus rights do not extend to Bagram detainees.  Yet, the D.C. Circuit did 
not go far enough.  Because Boumediene‘s analysis considers whether the 
detention facility is located in an active theater of war,30 we are left with 
the question as to the scope of that theater.  This analysis shows that the 
war against al Qaeda and the insurgency is global in nature, logically 
extending the theater of war to any country with an insurgent presence.  
This means that a detainee captured outside of a particular theater of war, 
such as Afghanistan, has still been captured in some theater.   
The D.C. Circuit did not take into consideration this global dynamic.  
The court understood that there was no evidence in this case that the 
Executive intentionally sought to avoid the reach of the constitution by 
transferring the detainees to an active theater of war, especially considering 
that the Executive could not have ―anticipate[d] the complex litigation 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 97. 
 26. See id. (―[T]he position of the United States is even stronger in this case than it was 
in Eisentrager‖ because active hostilities had come to an end in Germany when the German 
nationals were captured and convicted in China and detained in Landsberg Prison in 
Germany). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 96–97 (stating that even though the detainees made a strong case 
regarding the insufficiency of the process afforded to them, this did not end the habeas 
analysis under Boumediene).  
 29. Id. at 98. 
 30. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (citing Reid v. Covert,  
354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)) (acknowledging that a detention 
facility located in an active theater of war would affect its analysis because ―arguments that 
issuing the writ would be ‗impracticable or anomalous‘ would have more weight‖). 
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history . . . and predict the Boumediene decision long before it came 
down.‖31  However, the court noted that Boumediene did not claim that its 
three factors were exhaustive; instead, the D.C. Circuit noted that future 
litigants might be successful arguing that the Executive intentionally sought 
―to evade judicial review of . . . detention decisions by transferring 
detainees into active conflict zones, thereby granting the Executive the 
power to switch the Constitution on or off at will.‖32   
Such an opening for future detainees contesting their detention in federal 
court demonstrates a poor understanding of the Obama administration‘s 
ineptly phrased ―overseas contingency operations.‖33  Notably, the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) presumes the global 
nature of this war by broadly defining potential targets as ―nations, 
organizations, or persons‖ and defines the purpose as ―prevent[ing future] 
acts of international terrorism.‖34   
Prior to September 11, 2001, al Qaeda employed a hierarchical structure 
in Afghanistan, similar to how a military operates,35 but still maintained 
significant global ties.36  During the 1990‘s, al Qaeda had an annual budget 
of $30 million and had trained 10,000 to 20,000 fighters.37  Since the U.S.-
led war against al Qaeda and the Taliban, al Qaeda has shifted its 
organizational structure to adapt to a changing environment.38  As with any 
insurgent organization, its top priority is to avoid complete destruction by a 
                                                          
 31. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98–99. 
 32. Id. at 98 (quoting Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 34, Al Maqaleh,  
605 F.3d 84 (Nos. 09-5265, 09-5266, 09-5277)). 
 33. Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, “Global War On Terror” Is Given New Name, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 25, 2009.  
 34. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(emphasis added). 
 35. See JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR:  THE NEXT STAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE END 
OF GLOBALIZATION 140 (2007) (explaining that al Qaeda operated along hierarchical lines in 
Afghanistan and maintained a dispersed network elsewhere). 
 36. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 55–56 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].   
Bin Laden envisioned himself ―as head of an international jihad confederation,‖ and 
deservedly so because he had formed an ―Islamic Army Shura‖ that coordinated the 
activities of terrorist organizations spread throughout the world.  See id. at 58 (finding that 
these organizations were located in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea, and noting that Bin 
Laden also had links, albeit ―less formal,‖ with terrorist groups in Chad, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bosnia).   
 37. MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS:  WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON 
TERROR 60 (2004); Eben Kaplan, The Rise of al-Qaedaism, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/11033/rise_of_alqaedism.html (last 
updated July 18, 2007). 
 38. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 140 (observing that once the U.S. completed the 
invasion of Afghanistan and assassinated ―key individuals,‖ al Qaeda ―fragment[ed]‖ due to 
the ―limits on group size‖ associated with concentrating large groups of people in one 
discernible location).  
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single attack or military campaign.39  As such, al Qaeda has created ―small 
units with good administrative capabilities‖ that ―will spare [them] big 
losses,‖ in contrast to ―[l]arge military units [that] occupy large areas which 
are difficult to conceal from air reconnaissance and air attack.‖40  These 
networks of small units are not run by Osama bin Laden or any of his top 
associates, making it more difficult to disrupt the network by killing al 
Qaeda‘s top leaders.41   
Globalization has empowered these networks of ―global guerrillas,‖ as 
―[t]hey are wired, educated, and globally mobile.‖42  Moreover, ―[t]hey 
build complex supply chains, benefit from global money flows, travel 
globally, innovate with technology, and attack shrewdly.‖43  These groups 
employ open-source warfare, where individuals join based on the promise 
that teamwork will generate ―amazing results.‖44  This promise unites the 
entire community, and does not mean that the individual members or 
groups share the same motivations.45  Most importantly, these small units 
can still have devastating effects, as the September 11th attacks 
demonstrate.46 
This structure has allowed al Qaeda to retain its influence in many of the 
countries in which it had a presence prior to September 11th.47  It has also 
                                                          
 39.  SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 60. 
 40. See id. at 60–61 (quoting Sayf al-Adil, al Qaeda‘s chief of military operations). 
 41. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 139 (arguing that assassinating ―a single operational 
leader will not work,‖ just as killing the leader of the 9/11 attacks, Mohamed Atta, would 
not have disrupted the four-team network with one pilot each, as each group could function 
independently of Atta). 
 42. Id. at 146; see ROBERT M. CASSIDY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERROR:  MILITARY CULTURE AND IRREGULAR WAR vii (2006) (cautioning that al Qaeda 
has ―harnessed the advantages of globalization‖ to ―undermine the Western system of 
states‖). 
 43. ROBB, supra note 35, at 146; see SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 219–20 (discussing how 
the internet facilitates al Qaeda‘s advancement by allowing individuals throughout the world 
to receive online training without traveling to an insurgent training camp).  
 44. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 116 (stating that the promise of remarkable results is 
the ―central connection‖ that binds all members of the network); see also  
MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 135 (2004) (arguing that terrorist 
networks acquire new members not through ―common notions of recruitment and 
brainwashing,‖ but instead through social bonds). 
 45. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 116 (listing potential motivations such as ―patriotism, 
hatred of occupation, ethnic bigotry, religious fervor, [or] tribal loyalty,‖ but claiming that 
these do not necessarily matter so long as they all agree that they can achieve significant 
results). 
 46. See id. at 139 (citing the terrorist cells responsible for 9/11 as examples of how 
―[s]trategic attacks are possible with a network of less than seventy people‖).  Most 
importantly, the operational style of the terrorist cell responsible for 9/11 served as a 
precursor to al Qaeda‘s decentralized structure today, where the members of the cell ―used a 
sparse operational network,‖ had a leadership structure ―despite a lack of formal hierarchy,‖ 
and were run by ―relative unknowns‖ where the removal of a ―single operational leader‖ 
would not have disrupted the network.  Id. at 137–39.    
 47. See SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 71 (noting that al Qaeda‘s reach still extends to 
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been able to launch a series of attacks or attempts since September 11th, 
including the London train bombings, the train bombings in Madrid, a 
series of attacks in Saudi Arabia, multiple attacks in Iraq and Pakistan, and 
the recent Christmas Day attempted bombing of a commercial airplane 
flying into the United States.48  These global guerrillas have the capability 
to cause major infrastructure disruptions through targeted attacks on oil 
production and transportation as well as attacks on the U.S. power grid, to 
name a few.49  
While al Qaeda does not concentrate its forces in one location like a 
military, its members nevertheless have military training.  Therefore the 
term ―insurgent‖ better defines the al Qaeda member than ―terrorist,‖ as al 
Qaeda‘s training camps primarily ―provide quality and uniform religious 
and paramilitary—or insurgent—training to young Muslims.‖50  These 
camps have trained thousands of insurgents, who then travel home to ―fight 
and train others—not swarms of terrorists.‖51  While al Qaeda does train 
terrorists in these camps, they are more accurately described as ―al Qaeda‘s 
urban warfare arm, or special forces.‖52  Thus, the insurgents who have 
made their way through al Qaeda‘s training camps have familiarity with 
various combat skills and weapons, and thus pose a threat to the United 
States and its overseas interests.53  Even more troubling is the fact that new 
                                                          
―Somalia, Kenya, and the East Coast of Africa; the Pacific countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines; Chechnya, Kashmir, and the new Central Asian states; the countries of 
Western Europe; and Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Canada‖). 
 48. See, e.g., U.S. Dep‘t of State, Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961–2003:  A Brief 
Chronology, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) 
(Pakistan); Al-Qaeda group claims bomb plot, BBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/8433151.stm  
(attempted Christmas Day bombing); Timeline:  Al-Qaeda, BBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/in_depth/3618762.stm  
(Saudi Arabia, London, Madrid). 
 49. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 94–110 (describing potential vulnerabilities by 
explaining how the interconnectedness of the global economy and infrastructure systems 
allows for insurgents to target only a few aspects of a network but achieve near total system 
collapse).  For instance, if insurgents targeted the U.S. power grid, they could ―shut down 60 
percent of the grid with the removal of only 2 percent of the high-load nodes.‖  Id. at 105.  
Some experts believe that another attack on  
U.S. soil is inevitable and would likely be bigger than September 11th.  See STEPHEN 
FLYNN, THE EDGE OF DISASTER:  REBUILDING A RESILIENT NATION 36, 96 (2007). 
 50. See SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 217 (noting that these camps have taught insurgents 
―a deep skill set over a narrow range,‖ producing insurgents instead of terrorists); CASSIDY, 
supra note 42, at 11 (stating that the United States has ―limited‖ its definition of the enemy 
by mischaracterizing the war as one solely against terrorism as opposed to an insurgency). 
 51. See SCHEUER supra note 1, at 217 (describing how the camp-system operated in 
Afghanistan, but also noting that such camps existed in Sudan, Yemen, the Phillipines, 
Chechnya, and Saudi Arabia, each of which primarily trained insurgents, not terrorists).  
 52. See id. (criticizing the United States‘ fixation on a ―small number of terrorists‖ and 
―camps producing assassins and suicide bombers,‖ instead of addressing the key issue:  the 
several thousand insurgents with combat-training produced from these camps). 
 53. See id. (listing the various combat skills al Qaeda insurgents have learned, such as 
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recruits can receive online training without having to travel to a training 
camp.54   
This analysis indicates that the insurgency has global roots and global 
capabilities to launch attacks in a variety of countries.  It shows that 
defining an active combat zone as one where traditional military operations 
take place ignores the manner in which the current enemy operates.  
Because the insurgency stretches beyond the borders of any one country, 
the theater of war logically extends to not only Afghanistan where al Qaeda 
still operates, but to any locale in which al Qaeda and its affiliates recruit 
operatives, plan operations, carry out attacks, or evade capture.  
Consequently, the separation of powers concerns that motivated the 
Boumediene court, namely transferring detainees from one particular region 
of an active war to a place outside that theater as a means to avoid judicial 
review, does not have the same application to Bagram or other similarly 
situated detention facilities.  Furthermore, this conclusion renders irrelevant 
the argument that the Executive has intentionally transferred combatants to 
an active conflict zone.  Unlike the D.C. Circuit, courts considering this 
issue in the future should recognize that traditional notions of warfare no 
longer apply and take into account the fact that Boumediene only concerned 
the issue of combatants captured on the battlefield and transferred off the 
battlefield to Guantánamo Bay, far away from any hostilities.  In striking 
contrast, the detainees involved in Al Maqaleh were captured on the global 
battlefield and transferred to another theater of the same war.55 
While some may counter that this argument is inconsistent with 
Boumediene because the Guantánamo detainees had also been captured in 
an active theater of war, such an argument ignores the fact that 
Guantánamo Bay is not in an active theater of war by the accepted 
definition or by the definition proposed herein.  Bagram is clearly in an 
active theater of war, and based on this analysis, detainees captured outside 
                                                          
how to use ―AK-47s, Stinger missiles, GPS systems, advanced land navigation, RPGs, map 
reading, demolition techniques, celestial navigation, hand-to-hand combat techniques, 
trench digging, weapons deployment, escape and evasion techniques, first aid, scientific 
calculations to plot artillery fire, first aid, [and] secure communications‖). 
 54. See id. at 219–20 (discussing how any individual with internet access can receive 
jihadist training, thus increasing the pool of potential recruits).   
 55. Regarding the four detainees involved in Al Maqaleh, each was either a national of 
or captured in a country with an al Qaeda presence, which further supports the argument that 
Bagram detainees have been transferred from one theater of the war to another theater of the 
same war.  See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604  
F. Supp. 2d 208, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the four Bagram detainees before the court 
were captured in the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, Pakistan, and outside Afghanistan 
respectively, and were originally from Yemen, Afghanistan, and Tunisia), rev’d, 605 F.3d 
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010); THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 58 (noting that al 
Qaeda has a presence in multiple countries, including Thailand, Pakistan, and Afghanistan). 
MICHAEL BUXTON 60.2 
528 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:519 
 
of Afghanistan have still been captured in part of a theater of war.  
Moreover, to claim that this argument is inconsistent with Boumediene 
ignores the fact that Boumediene emphasized the unique characteristics of 
Guantánamo Bay, effectively limiting the extension of this doctrine to other 
detention facilities.56   
To be true to Boumediene, we also must consider the impracticalities 
created by courts ignoring the global dynamic of the insurgency.   
As has been well-documented, Guantánamo Bay is closed to new 
detainees.57  But the war against this global insurgency did not end when 
President Obama took office; rather, in some respects it intensified.58  A 
real need therefore exists to house newly-captured detainees.  If courts 
involved in future litigation find reason to believe that the Executive has 
intentionally transferred insurgents to active war zones to avoid the reach 
of the constitution and consequently grants habeas corpus protection to the 
insurgents, then the United States faces at least two options, each of which 
creates significant impracticalities.  One option is to find a location within 
the country of capture to detain insurgents, likely leading to the transfer of 
the insurgent to the custody of that country‘s government.  Such a step may 
increase the likelihood that the insurgent will be tortured59 or may make it 
easier for the insurgent to escape from custody.60   
A second option involves confining insurgents in secretly-run U.S. 
detention centers in various locations around the world.61  However, this 
                                                          
 56. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 763–65 (2008) (discussing how 
Guantánamo Bay is considerably different than post-World War II Landsberg Prison in 
Germany). 
 57. Ernesto Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba:  Does the 
“Empire Strike Back”?, 62 SMU L. REV. 117, 124 (2009). 
 58. See, e.g., Greg Miller & Julian E. Barnes, Drone Plan Opens New War Front,  
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A1 (discussing the expansion of the CIA Predator drone 
strikes in Pakistan).  
 59. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997–98 (9th Cir. 
2009) (describing how the plaintiffs were either captured by the United States and then 
transferred to the custody of other governments and allegedly tortured, or captured by 
countries other than the United States and allegedly tortured before being transferred to U.S. 
custody), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing 
Torture, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 108–09, 115, 123 (discussing how 
the United States captured combatants and allegedly transferred them to countries where 
they were tortured, including Uzbekistan, Bosnia, Egypt, and Syria). 
 60. See, e.g., Main Suspects in USS Cole Bombing Escape from Yemeni Prison, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 11, 2003), 
 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,83890,00.html (stating that ten of the major suspects 
in the USS Cole bombing escaped from a Yemeni prison on April 11, 2003, including the 
primary suspect). 
 61. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1 (reporting that the CIA ran secret detention centers throughout the world in the 
aftermath of September 11th).  With the coming of the Obama administration, it was 
generally assumed that secret CIA detention centers would be closed, which, according to 
most accounts, is the case.  Joshua Partlow & Julie Tate, 2 Afghans Allege Abuse at U.S. 
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could lead to less support from U.S. allies62 and increase insurgent 
recruitment,63 thus negatively affecting the war effort.64  Each option 
presents choices with consequences that proponents of granting habeas 
protection to detainees would generally consider abhorrent.  
B. Dis-incentivizing Judicial Intervention 
This analysis does not support the proposition that Bagram detainees, or 
any other detainees captured and detained by U.S. forces overseas, should 
be detained indefinitely without adequate procedural protection.  The 
Boumediene Court concluded that the process received by Guantánamo 
detainees was an inadequate habeas substitute,65 and the D.C. Circuit 
correctly concluded that the process afforded Bagram detainees was less 
than that of the Guantánamo detainees, but the D.C. Circuit did not define 
―adequate process.‖66  Reports indicate that Bagram detainees have faced 
harsh treatment and poor living conditions that are ―in many ways rougher 
and . . . bleak[er] than its counterpart in Cuba.‖67  Yet, in late 2009, Bagram 
detainees moved into a new facility that will eventually be operated and 
controlled by the Afghan government.68  
Along with this new facility, the United States recently implemented 
enhanced procedural protections for the Bagram detainees, including the 
creation of detainee review boards that allow detainees to contest their 
detention within sixty days of imprisonment and every six months 
                                                          
Site, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2009, at A1.  However, recent reports indicate that U.S. Special 
Forces are running such a facility in Afghanistan, away from Bagram Air Base, where 
recent reports of detainee abuse surfaced.  Id. 
 62. TASK FORCE ON U.S. STANDING IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ASSOCIATION, U.S. STANDING IN THE WORLD:  CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND THE FUTURE, 10 
(2009), available at  
https://apsanet.org/media/PDFs/APSAUSStandingShortFinal.pdf. 
 63. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security 
(May 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-
200900388.pdf (arguing that both Guantánamo Bay and allegations of torture have helped al 
Qaeda‘s recruiting efforts). 
 64. See, e.g., id. (stating that Guantánamo Bay and allegations of torture have 
undermined the war on terrorism). 
 65. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767, 790–92 (2008) (discussing the 
deficient procedural protections available to Guantánamo detainees, ultimately holding that 
these were an inadequate habeas substitute).  
 66. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 67. See Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak 
Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at A1 (―Men are held by the dozen in large wire 
cages, the detainees and military sources said, sleeping on the floor on foam mats and, until 
about a year ago, often using plastic buckets for latrines.  Before recent renovations, they 
rarely saw daylight except for brief visits to a small exercise yard.‖). 
 68. See Kim Gamel, Afghans Agree on Handover Plan for U.S. – Run Prison, AP, Jan. 
9, 2010 (noting that the Afghan government said that it would immediately commence 
training exercises for approximately 800 Afghan soldiers to prepare them for running the 
detention facility). 
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thereafter.69  These review boards seek to determine whether the detainees 
provided ―substantial support‖ to the Taliban, al Qaeda, or related forces 
engaging in hostilities against coalition forces, representing a change from 
the previous standard of ―support.‖70  The review board itself consists of 
three U.S. officers advised by a military attorney.71  Bagram detainees are 
individually assigned a ―personal representative‖ to ―advocate on [their] 
behalf,‖ explain to the detainees the review process in place,72 and gather 
evidence,73 but these representatives are not lawyers.74  Detainees are 
notified of the review board‘s decision in writing within one week, and will 
be released ―as soon as practicable‖ if they do not meet the criteria.‖75   
While these changes are significant, the next step should be improving 
the status determination process so as to remove the primary rationale for 
judicial interference in Executive detention decisions; namely, the 
indefinite detention of alleged combatants without sufficient process.  In 
commenting on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) process at 
Guantánamo Bay, the Court cited the constraints placed upon detainees to 
contest the factual basis of their detention, noting that detainees have 
―limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the Government‘s 
case against [them, do] not have the assistance of counsel[,] and may not be 
aware of the critical allegations that the Government relied upon to order 
[their] detention.‖76   
An enhanced process should give the detainees the right to challenge 
their detention while also affording the U.S. government the ability to use 
                                                          
 69. Gerry J. Gilmore, Bagram Detention Facility to Implement Case Review Panels, 
U.S. DEP‘T OF DEFENSE (Sept. 14, 2009), 
 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55831  
(last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
 70. SAHR MUHAMMEDALLY, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FIXING BAGRAM:  STRENGTHENING 
DETENTION REFORMS TO ALIGN WITH U.S. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 4 (2009), available at 
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/Fixing-Bagram-110409.pdf. 
 71. See Rubin supra note 14 (contrasting the review board‘s new duties with those of 
the past, which involved reviewing a detainee‘s case only once, followed by renewal 
detention orders based purely on a ―paper record‖). 
 72. Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility For Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2009, at A8. 
 73. MUHAMMEDALLY, supra note 70, at 5. 
 74. See Rubin, supra note 14 (noting that human rights advocates claim that these new 
procedures will leave detainees with ―little more recourse‖ than they have already). 
 75. MUHAMMEDALLY, supra note 14, at 6; see Rubin, supra note 71 (reporting that 
release rates rose ―drastically‖ in Iraq after similar procedures were put in place); Ron 
Synovitz, New U.S. Plan Reportedly to Let Afghan Prisoners Challenge Incarceration, 
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 14, 2009), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/New_US_Plan_Reportedly_To_Let_Afghan_Prisoners_Challe
nge_Incarceration/1822216.html (concluding that this process resembles the process used in 
Iraq, where officials determine which detainees pose the most significant threat and which 
can be rehabilitated and released back into society). 
 76. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783–84 (2008). 
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evidence in a manner that would not compromise national security.  This 
could be done by creating procedures that allow the government to use 
classified evidence much in the same way that the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (CIPA) enables the government to use classified evidence 
in civilian courts.77  This would also give detainees the right to review the 
evidence used to justify their detention, provided that this evidence is 
presented in a manner that would not compromise national security.78  
Classified information and sources could also be protected by placing a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the government‘s evidence,79 as well as 
admitting hearsay evidence as the most reliable evidence when necessary.80   
As for procedural protections, each detainee should be entitled to an 
attorney, possibly a military lawyer (as opposed to personal 
representatives), who can present exculpatory witnesses and evidence.81  
Also, the review panels should be replaced with a neutral magistrate, such 
as a military judge, who would have the authority to release detainees if the 
evidence favors such a decision.82  These attorneys, however, should not 
                                                          
 77. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 78. See, e.g., id. (providing procedures for the use of classified evidence in civilian 
trials); United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1325 (D.N.M. 2000) (explaining that 
CIPA ―provides for pretrial procedures to resolve questions of admissibility of classified 
information in advance of its use in open court‖).  CIPA defines classified information as 
―‗information and material‘ subject to classification or otherwise requiring protection from 
public disclosure,‖ meaning that ―CIPA applies to classified testimony as well as to 
classified documents.‖  See Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 1 
(2006)); Sarah Lorr, Comment, Reconciling Classified Evidence and a Petitioner’s Right to 
a “Meaningful Review” at Guantánamo Bay:  A Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2669, 2673 (2009) (arguing that a ―CIPA-like statute‖ should be passed by Congress to deal 
with classified evidence issues in Guantánamo habeas proceedings so that detainees can 
have a meaningful review of their detention). 
 79. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 (2004) (holding that a U.S. 
citizen deemed an enemy-combatant is entitled to due process protections, but noting that 
―the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that . . . enemy-combatant proceedings . . 
. be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of 
ongoing military conflict‖ by placing a ―presumption in favor of the government‘s evidence, 
so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were 
provided‖). 
 80. See, e.g. id. (stating that hearsay evidence could be admissible in enemy combatant 
proceedings for a U.S. citizen as a further means to deal with national security concerns); 
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT 
BROOKINGS, THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION:  THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS 
LAWMAKING 35 (2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.aspx (discussing 
the different forms of hearsay evidence used in habeas hearings for Guantánamo detainees, 
including intelligence reports summarizing information from a variety of sources, records 
produced from interrogating detainees, and summaries of statements made by detainees 
during CSRT hearings).  
 81. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 14 (reporting that the U.S. government released the 
names of the detainees held at Bagram, but noting that human rights advocates believed that 
while this was an important step, it did not go far enough because ―[l]awyers need more 
than detainees‘ names to find their families and see if they want legal representation‖). 
 82. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (concluding that a U.S. citizen held in the United 
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have access to the detainees until the United States has had reasonable time 
to interrogate them for useful information that could prevent future attacks 
against U.S. forces and civilians.  Yet, the grounds for continued detention 
should be independent of any information gathered during interrogation.  
Finally, because the magistrate‘s factual findings and status determination 
will not be free from error even with these procedures in place, there 
should also be a periodical review process conducted by a military judge 
who can hear new evidence that may exonerate a detainee and order release 
when circumstances permit such an outcome.83   
Implementing these procedural protections would enhance national 
security by promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan while ensuring that 
dangerous detainees remain imprisoned. 
CONCLUSION 
While the D.C. Circuit took an important step in not extending habeas 
corpus protection to Bagram detainees, they left unanswered two crucial 
questions.  Because the court did not acknowledge how the global nature of 
the insurgency affects the habeas analysis, future litigation may turn on 
whether there is evidence that the Executive transferred combatants to an 
active war zone to avoid the reach of the Constitution.  Moreover, even 
though the court did not comment on the appropriate procedural protections 
due to detainees, the Executive should still be mindful that further judicial 
intervention could undermine war efforts.   
 
                                                          
States as an enemy combatant must ―be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the 
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker‖); Rubin, supra note 14 
(stating that the new review procedures will lead to a quicker release of erroneously held 
detainees at Bagram). 
 83. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786 (2008). 
